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Abstract  
The study investigates the role of corporate ownership 
identities on dividend policy of Malaysian listed firms. It 
also examines the severity of agency problems among 
identities of ownership through its effect on dividend 
policy after controlling for the moderating effect of 
growth opportunity. The study sample includes 407 firms 
for the period of 2012 to 2015. In general, the results 
show that ownership concentration aligns the managers-
owner interests toward the optimal growth opportunity, 
thus the demand of substantial shareholders' on dividends 
shifts from positive to negative after considering the 
moderating effect of growth opportunity. In firms 
controlled by managers, the high alignment of interests 
results in lower dividend payout. The severity of agency 
and expropriation threats in family controlled firms leads 
to higher dividends even after considering the 
moderating effect of growth opportunity. Finally, 
whereas government and foreign ownership are 
associated with higher dividend payout, the interaction 
effects of growth opportunities are unclear in such firms. 
Keywords: dividend policy, ownership structure, 
growth opportunity 
 1. Introduction  
Dividend policy has received great interest in the 
extant literature as an influential key in firms’ 
corporate governance. Researchers argue that 
dividends impose a financial monitoring 
mechanism that restrains managers from using 
firms' cash flows for their own interests 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Rozeff, 1982). 
They suggest that dividends curtail the excess cash 
that might be subject to managers' discretion. 
Moreover, disgorging the cash out in dividends 
form keeps firms constantly under financial market 
monitoring as they regularly depend on the market 
for capital. Consequently, high dividends alleviate 
the agency costs that arise due to the contradiction 
of interests between managers and shareholders. 
However, high dividends might not be desirable at 
all time. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argue that the severity of external finance 
costs increases when firms experience high growth 
opportunities. Therefore, firms balance their 
internally generated funds with investment 
opportunities. Accordingly, firms reduce dividends 
to avoid expensive external finance and increase 
dividends only when there is a persistent surplus in 
free cash flow over investment expenses. They 
attribute the costs of external finance to the 
information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. 
Given the agency costs and information asymmetry 
costs, if shareholders are aware of growth 
opportunities, their demand for dividends should be 
decreased, but the separation of shareholdings and 
management undermines the shareholders' 
awareness of growth opportunities. Furthermore, 
the severity of agency problems might overwhelm 
the firms’ concern regarding costs of finance. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982) and 
Easterbrook (1984) assert that ownership 
concentration, large shareholders and managerial 
ownership result in great convergence between 
managers and shareholders. Such convergence of 
interests relieves the agency costs and could 
substitute the dividends-induced monitoring. In 
contrast, La Porta et al. (2000a) and Faccio et al. 
(2001) highlight a different sort of agency conflicts 
that are associated with ownership concentration. 
They suggest that controlling shareholders, like 
managers, might extract benefits from firms’ 
policies at the expense of minority shareholders. La 
Porta et al. (2000a) find that firms with high 
growth opportunity keep paying high dividends 
when the threats of expropriation of minority 
wealth are high. In addition, researchers 
demonstrate that the relationship between 
dividends and corporate ownership varies based on 
the identity of dominant shareholders (Al-
Nawaiseh, 2013; Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Truong 
& Heaney, 2007). 
The objective of this study is to investigate the role 
of different corporate ownership identities on the 
dividend policy of the Malaysian firms. The study 
also examines the interaction between growth 
opportunities and ownership identities as a 
determinant factor of dividend policy. The 
corporate ownership in Malaysia has been reported 
to be highly concentrated. In a study of 599 
sampled firms from Malaysia, Lim et al. (2014) 
document that the largest shareholders on average 
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own 30.5% of firms' shareholdings. This high 
ownership concentration raises the probability of 
expropriation of minority shareholdings in 
Malaysia. La Porta et al. (2000b) argue that 
ownership concentration is most common in the 
market with lower investors’ protection. However, 
according to the World Bank’s shareholders 
protection index, Malaysia scored the highest level 
among countries on average over the period 1990 
to 2013 (The World Bank, 2015). Furthermore, 
researchers who have used the legal system as a 
measurement of investors' protection, suggest that 
common law is associated with higher protection 
compared to civil law (Faccio et al., 2001; 
Katelouzou & Siems, 2015). Accordingly, 
investors shall enjoy higher protection as Malaysia 
adopts a common law legal system. In contrast, 
Tam and Tan (2007) allege that despite the strong 
legal framework in Malaysia, the enforcement is 
inefficient. The intervention of government and 
large shareholders impedes the protection of 
investors in Malaysia. Benjamin et al. (2016) assert 
that unlike developed markets in common law 
countries, shareholders in Malaysian market enjoy 
a strong legal system of protection with high 
private benefits of control. 
Besides the high ownership concentration, 
corporate ownership in Malaysia has shown a 
variety of dominant shareholders’ identities. Amran 
and Ahmad (2013) reported that in average 
managers and families hold 44.6% and 43.2% of 
the Malaysia firms’ ownership respectively. 
Narasingam and Vasudevan (2014) highlight that 
government ownership accounts for 36% market 
capitalization of Bursa Malaysia. Ghazali (2010) 
found that foreigners have a mean shareholding of 
23.8% of Malaysian firms that included in KLSE 
composite index. 
The variety in corporate ownership identities and 
the severity of agency problems in the Malaysian 
market motivates the study to investigate the role 
of corporate ownership identities on dividend 
policy. This study contributes to the literature of 
corporate ownership and corporate finance by 
examining the interaction of ownership structure 
and ownership identity with growth opportunity to 
form the firms' agency costs and their relation to 
dividend policy in that firms. By doing so, the 
study could rank the severity of agency problem 
based on the identity of controlling shareholders 
and determine whether the level of dividends 
reflects the probability of expropriation. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1 Information asymmetry Model 
Basically, the main assumption of information 
asymmetry theory is that managers have 
information about firms that are not clearly 
revealed to outsiders. Therefore, firms’ policies and 
managers' decisions might convey unambiguously 
signal to outsiders regarding firms' future 
performance. However, literature developed two 
opposite theoretical models of information 
asymmetry regarding dividends. 
John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock 
(1985) developed a theoretical model to predict 
dividend policy under information asymmetry. 
They suggested that future cash flow could be 
inferred through firms’ dividends changes. When 
managers are expecting higher growth in earnings 
based on information that outsiders do not know, 
dividends could indirectly reflect future growth. 
Hence, dividends are used to attenuate the 
information asymmetry between managers and 
outsiders. Yoon and Starks (1995) found that 
dividends increase were followed by significant 
capital expenditure growth and dividends changes 
were associated with analysts' expectations 
regarding future earnings. 
An alternate model, although not mutually 
exclusive, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argue that information asymmetry increase 
the cost of finance, the investors' unawareness of 
investment opportunities lead to undervaluing the 
newly issued securities. Therefore, managers could 
abandon a profitable investment opportunity under 
information asymmetry. To avoid underinvestment 
problem, firms build up financial slake by paying 
less dividends.  
2.2 Agency Model 
In the literature, two types of agency problems are 
highlighted. The primary assumption of agency-I is 
that the separation of ownership and management 
raises the probability of contradiction of interests 
between managers (agent) and shareholders 
(principal) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers 
could deviate from the firms' main objective of 
maximizing shareholders wealth and modify firms' 
policies to achieve private benefits. Such an agency 
problem (agent-principal conflicts or agency I) is 
more pronounced in firms with highly dispersed 
ownership structure. According to agency theory I, 
insider ownership and outside ownership 
concentration reduce the likelihood of conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and contribute 
to aligned decisions making (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Furthermore, dividend policy is an effective 
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monitoring device to limit the free cash flow which 
is subject to managerial exploitation (Jensen, 1986; 
Rozeff, 1982). 
Agency type II represents the severity of agency 
when large shareholders use their voting power to 
affect decisions making and firms’ policies for their 
own interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, 
minority shareholders are exposed to the risks of 
expropriation with higher ownership concentration. 
The expropriation threats are widely found in an 
environment with poor investment protection and 
week corporate governance (Faccio et al., 2001; La 
Porta et al., 2000b).  
2.3 Dividends, Ownership Structure and 
Growth Opportunities 
Literature extensively investigated the relationship 
between corporate ownership and dividend policy. 
Nevertheless, these studies show inconclusive 
findings. The explanations of dividend-ownership 
relation were based on the severity of agency 
problem that firms confront. Some studies have 
found a negative relationship between dividends 
and ownership concentration (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 
2003; Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Maury & Pajuste, 
2002; Rozeff, 1982; Yusof et al., 2016). They have 
concluded that the concentration on ownership 
structure creates an alignment of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Since large 
shareholders can easily monitor the management, 
the alignment effects reduce the need for dividend-
induced monitoring. 
On the other hand, several studies have found that 
positive relationship exists between dividend and 
ownership concentration (Ahmed & Javid, 2009; 
Fairchild et al., 2014; Miko & Kamardin, 2015; 
Setiawan et al., 2016; Thanatawee, 2013). Unlike 
dispersed ownership, managers in concentrated 
firms are disciplined by controlling shareholders 
who force them to pay higher dividends (Miko & 
Kamardin, 2015). Contrary to alignment 
hypothesis, Fairchild et al. (2014) argue that the 
presence of large shareholders might indicate a 
negative impact on agency costs and raise the 
contradiction in interests between the dominant and 
minority shareholders. Therefore, higher dividends 
are demand with the presence of ownership 
concentration. Most studies that investigate the 
majority-minority conflicts of shareholders refer 
the agency costs to the probability of expropriation 
under weak investor protection and legal system 
(Bebchuk, 1999; Faccio et al., 2001; Fairchild et 
al., 2014; Truong & Heaney, 2007).  
The question remains whether dividend policy is 
merely determined due to firms' agency problems, 
or whether agency variables are proxy for other 
variables. The root of agency problems is imputed 
to the insiders' discretion (managers or large 
shareholders) on firms' free cash flow. Jensen 
(1986) suggests that the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders regarding dividend 
policy are represented in disgorging out the excess 
cash after holding all investment opportunities with 
positive net present value. Therefore, the firms’ 
agency costs are based on managers-owner 
perception regarding the optimal growth. Managers 
tend to hold higher growth, which might be beyond 
the optimal size and include investments with 
negative net present value. Accordingly, based on 
the alignment hypothesis, ownership concentration 
should align the interests of managers and 
shareholders toward growth opportunities. 
Consistent with Myers (1984) assertion that 
dividends relationship with investment opportunity 
is negative, the relationship between dividends and 
ownership could be positive or negative according 
to firms growth opportunities.  
In contrast to alignment hypothesis, the negative 
impact of ownership concentration might make 
dividend-ownership relation are indifferent to the 
firms’ growth opportunity. In point of fact, Johnson 
et al. (2000) provide several circumstances where 
dominant shareholders have used firms' profitable 
growth opportunities to expropriate small 
shareholders wealth. La Porta et al. (2000a) suggest 
that minority shareholders are exposed to higher 
agency problems in countries with weak legal 
protections. They conclude that dividend policy 
under good protection is an outcome of firms’ 
growth opportunities. In addition, dividend policy 
under weak protection is a substitute for the poor 
legal protection.  
Therefore, the general expectation for the relation 
is that if ownership structure results in lower 
agency costs, dividend policy will be subject to 
non-monitoring factors, and the relationships 
between ownership structure and dividends are 
moderated negatively by firms’ growth 
opportunities. Similarly, if ownership structure 
increases the severity of agency problems, 
dividend-induced monitoring is a key factor of 
dividend policy, and growth opportunity has no 
moderating effect on the relationship between 
dividend and ownership structure. Thus, study 
mainly hypothesizes that: 
H1a: Dividend payout is positively related to 
ownership concentration. 
H1b: Growth opportunities negatively moderate the 
relationship between dividend and 
ownership concentration. 
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Similarly, literature provides inconclusive results 
regarding the relationship between dividend payout 
and the different identities of ownership. Both 
positive and negative relationships are found and 
justified by either the alignment effects or the 
minority concern of expropriation.  Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed (2010), Pindado et al. (2012), Benjamin et 
al. (2016) and Setiawan et al. (2016) found a 
positive relationship between dividend payout and 
family ownership. They suggested that the presence 
of family ownership enhances shareholders 
monitoring on management on one hand and 
intensifies the threats of expropriation on the other 
hand. Thus, higher dividends payout is associated 
with family ownership. De Cesari (2012), Hwang 
et al. (2013), Michiels et al. (2015) and Attig et al. 
(2016) found a negative relationship between 
dividend payout and family ownership. Djebali 
(2015) argue that since family shareholders directly 
engage in management or indirectly "strong 
monitoring on it", the agency problem is not so 
acute in these firms. Furthermore, the family 
concern about the bankruptcy risk and financial 
costs as well as the family name and future 
generation motivate family controlled firms to 
reduce the dividend payout. 
Other types of ownership identity are government 
and foreign ownership. Unlike private investors, 
the government has economic, political, and social 
objectives that might affect firms’ policies 
differently. Al-Malkawi (2007) conclude that firms 
controlled by government are exposed to double 
principal-agent conflicts where citizens are the 
ultimate owners of the firms. Glen et al. (1995) 
suggest that since investors’ protection is mainly 
government responsibility, minority concerns are 
given great attention in firms controlled by the 
government. However, although Wang et al. 
(2011),  Abdullah et al. (2014) and Lin et al. 
(2017) found positive relationship between 
dividend and government ownership, negative 
relationships are reported by Asadi and Oladi 
(2015) and Al-Najjar et al. (2016). In the same 
way, mixed results have been reported in the 
literature regarding the relationship between 
dividends and foreign ownership. Jeon et al. 
(2011), Warrad et al. (2012), Setiawan et al. (2016) 
and Cao et al. (2017) report that foreign ownership 
has a significant positive relationship with dividend 
payout. Mian and Nagata (2015) argue that active 
monitoring of foreign ownership optimizes the 
investment and dividend policies in the firms. 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) Lam et al. (2012) 
Al-Najjar et al. (2016) have found a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and 
dividend payout. They mutually agree that foreign 
investors target the capital appreciation and long-
run growth rather than dividends. 
 Extension to the above discussion, this study 
suggests that the severity of agency problems might 
varies within the country based on the identity of 
ownership. The family and managerial ownership 
are involved directly in the management; hence the 
alignment effects of concentration ownership are 
expected to be more pronounced in the case of 
family and managerial ownership. The excess cash 
flow would not be matter as it is under their direct 
discretion. In contrast, other identities of 
ownership, like government, foreign institute, and 
other outside large shareholders are not directly 
engaged in the management. Therefore, the 
ownership concentration drives alignment of 
interests toward optimal growth while the demand 
on dividends still remains. Based on the above 
discussion and literature review, the study 
hypothesizes that: 
H2a: Dividend payout is negatively related to 
managerial ownership. 
H2b: Growth opportunity negatively moderates the 
relationship between dividend and 
managerial ownership. 
H3a: Dividend payout is negatively related to 
family ownership. 
H3b: Growth opportunity negatively moderates the 
relationship between dividend payout and 
family ownership. 
H4a: Dividend payout is positively related to 
government ownership.  
H4b: Growth opportunity moderates the 
relationship between dividend payout and 
government ownership negatively. 
H5a: Dividend payout is positively related to 
foreign ownership. 
H5b: Growth opportunity moderates the 
relationship between dividend payout and 
foreign ownership negatively.  
 3. Methodology  
The population of the study was the Malaysian 
listed firms in the main market of Bursa Malaysia 
within the period of 2012 to 2015. Financial related 
firms are excluded from the sample since these 
firms are subject to different regulations and 
accounting standard. Firms with incomplete data 
were eliminated from the sample too. Finally, to 
avoid the misleading of zero dividends due to 
losses, firms that experience losses as the outcome 
of their activities were excluded. The final sample 
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is composed of 407 firms and a total of 1628 firm-
years observations. The financial data were 
collected from Worldscope Database (Thomson 
Financial). The data regarding corporate ownership 
variables were collected manually from the annual 
reports downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia 
website. 
3.1 Model Specification and Estimation 
Technique 
To examine the role of corporate ownership 
variables on firms’ dividend policy, a regression 
equation is specified as the basis for testing the 
study hypothesis. The regression model includes 
the firms' specific variables, which have been 
found significantly related to dividend policy in 
previous studies.  
Divit= β0 + β1CON+ β2 Family + β3 Managerial + β4 
Gov + β5 Foreign + β6 Tq + β7 ROA + β8 
Leverage + β9 Beta + Ɛ 
……………………………………… (1) 
 The dependent variable (Div) is dividend payout 
ratio as measured by the ratio of common cash 
dividend to operating income. Concentration 
ownership (CON) is the ratio of share held by 
substantial shareholders who own 5% of firms’ 
shareholdings or above. Family ownership 
(Family) is the ratio of share owned by family 
members. Managerial ownership (Managerial) is 
the ratio of share owned by executive members of 
the board of directors. Government Ownership 
(Gov) is the ratio of share owned by the federal 
government or its agencies. Foreign ownership 
(Foreign) is the ratio of share held by foreigner 
investors (individual and institutes). The 
shareholdings of substantial, family, government 
and foreigners include only the percentage of 
shares that are announced in the firms’ annual 
report as the top 30 largest shareholders and 
substantial shareholders with direct and indirect 
shareholdings. 
Tobin’s Q (Tq) is used to measure the firms’ 
growth opportunities, which equal the market value 
of equity plus the book value of total debt divided 
by the book value of total assets. Profitability 
(ROA) is measured by the ratio of net income to 
total assets. Capital structure (Leverage) is 
measured by the market value of leverage ratio, 
which equals the total debt divided by the market 
value of equity. Corporate risks (Beta) are 
measured by the beta of stock returns.  
To detect the interaction effect of ownership 
variables with growth opportunity on dividend 
policy, a second regression equation is specified. 
Growth opportunity (Tq) is multiplied with each 
corporate ownership variable to create the 
interaction terms and added to equation 1.  
Div= β0 + β1CON+ β2 Family + β3 Managerial + β4 
Gov + β5 Foreign + β6 Tq + β7 ROA + β8 
Leverage + β9 Beta + β10 CON*Tq+ β11 
Family*Tq + β12 Managerial*Tq + β13 
Gov*Tq + β14 Foreign*Tq + Ɛ 
……………………………... (2) 
The study uses two-stage least square (2sls) and 
Generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation techniques with robust standard error to 
evaluate equations 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that the 
regression model is suffered from homoscedasticity 
problem which leads to inefficient coefficients 
estimates and calls for using robust standard errors. 
Meanwhile, the Wooldridge test shows that the 
model is free of serial correlation at 5% level of 
significance. According to Wooldridge (2010), if 
the regression model is free of autocorrelation, but 
heterokedasticity is still raised, then the pooled 
OLS regression with robust standard error can be 
used. Furthermore, in applied econometric, if one 
of the independent variables is simultaneously 
determined with the dependent variable, the 
regression model will suffer from endogeneity 
problem, and inconsistent coefficients are 
estimated (Wooldridge, 2010). Wu-Hausman and 
Durbin tests detect that leverage ratio is 
endogenous variable, which can be remedied with 
2sls and GMM estimation technique1.  
                                                          
1 To apply instrumental variable estimation 
technique (2sls and GMM) financial leverage are 
instrumented by two variables: 1- the ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets 2- the ratio of 
effective tax rate.     
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Table 1: 
Durbin (score) Wu-Hausman  Heteroskedasticity Autocorrelation 
chi2(1) 10.77 F(1,1615) 10.76 chi2(1) 700.01 F(1,406) 3.761 
Prob>chi2 0.0010 Prob>F 0.0011 Prob>chi2   0.0000 Prob>F 0.0531 
H0: variables are 
exogenous 
H0: variables are 
exogenous 
Ho: Constant variance H0: no first-order 
autocorrelation 
Rejected Rejected Rejected accepted 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The summary statistics of variables for sampled 
firms are provided in Table 2. On an average, firms 
distribute 32.8% of their earnings in cash dividends 
forms which is similar to 33% reported by 
Benjamin et al. (2016) for a sample of Malaysian 
firms. The mean values of corporate ownership 
variables are 57%, 24%, 32%, 8.5% and 11% for 
substantial, family, managerial, government and 
foreign ownerships respectively. This indicates that 
the corporate ownership in Malaysia is highly 
concentrated and mostly dominated by family and 
managerial ownership. In addition, Table 2 shows 
that the sample firms have average values of 1.13, 
7.9%, 24% and 0.763 for growth opportunity, 
profitability, leverage ratio and firms’ risk 
respectively. The distribution of dividend payout 
ratios shows that it is positively high skewed and 
the kurtosis which represents the unflatter tails of 
payout ratio’s population. Therefore, winsorizing 
technique at 0.05 is used to eliminate the effect of 
extreme values in the data. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistic 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Div 0.328 0.262 0 14.84 13.331 29.68 
CON 0.569 0.148 0.118 0.893 -0.526 2.826 
Family 0.236 0.257 0 0.854 0.414 1.570 
Managerial 0.321 0.243 0 0.821 -0.086 1.663 
Gov 0.085 0.170 0 0.904 2.640 9.722 
Foreign 0.113 0.181 0 0.894 2.118 6.677 
Tq 1.136 1.314 0.145 16.23 5.466 43.58 
ROA 0.079 0.066 0.0001 0.196 0.989 3.401 
Leverage 0.237 0.221 0 0.923 0.742 2.592 
Beta 0.763 0.542 -0.577 2.811 0.652 3.507 
 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
In multiple regression models, the correlation 
between explanatory variables raises the 
multicollinearity problem which results in 
inaccurate results. The regression model is 
considered to have a multicollinearity problem 
when the correlation between independent 
variables exceeds 80% (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
From Table 3, the highest correlation value is 64%, 
which is between ROA and Tq. Therefore, the 
model of study is free of multicollinearity problem. 
For the interaction terms which are included in the 
model equation 2 (M3 and M4 Table 4), the 
interacted variables are centered before producing 
the interaction terms to avoid multicollinearity 
between interaction terms and original variables 
(Iacobucci et al., 2017).  
 
Table 3: Correlation analysis 
 Div CON Family Managerial Gov Foreign 
Div 1.000      
CON 0.159*** 1.000     
Family -0.088*** 0.086*** 1.000    
Managerial -0.207*** 0.142*** 0.621*** 1.000   
Gov 0.221*** 0.219*** -0.28*** -0.372*** 1.000  
Foreign 0.179*** 0.124*** -0.086*** -0.015*** -0.015 1.000 
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Tq 0.457*** 0.173*** -0.145*** -0.153*** 0.244*** 0.180*** 
ROA 0.234*** 0.078*** 0.039 -0.001 0.031*** 0.151*** 
Leverage -0.395*** -0.126*** -0.020 0.003 -0.065*** -0.204*** 
Standard 0.094*** 0.019 0.004 0.089*** -0.089*** 0.076*** 
Beta -0.193*** -0.201*** -0.045* 0.008 0.019 -0.073*** 
 Tq ROA Leverage Standard Beta  
Tq 1.000      
ROA 0.644*** 1.000     
Leverage -0.430*** -0.451*** 1.000    
Standard 0.314*** 0.503*** -0.302*** 1.000   
Beta 0.042* 0.081*** 0.033 0.089*** 1.000  
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 4 shows the results of regressing dividend 
against corporate ownership variables and firms’ 
characteristics. M1 and M2 indicate the direct 
relationship between dividend and independent 
variables based on 2sls and GMM estimations. M3 
and M4 indicate the relationship between dividends 
and ownership after accounting for the moderating 
effects of growth opportunities.  
The results of 2sls and GMM show that all 
variables in the model are statically significant 
except for the profitability (ROA). With respect to 
firms' specific variables, growth opportunity (Tq) 
and financial leverage (Leverage) are found to have 
a positive relationship with dividend payout, 
whereas the corporate risk has a negative 
relationship with dividend payout. In contrast to 
pecking order theory, the results suggest that firms 
with higher growth opportunity tend to pay more 
dividends. However, Myers (1984) in his 
discussion of pecking order theory, suggests that 
firms might not be able to change their dividend 
payout ratio in the short term. Therefore, the 
changes in firm net cash flow due to fluctuation in 
investment opportunities and profitability are dealt 
through debt and marketable securities. 
Furthermore, firms might use dividends to convey 
a positive signal about future earnings growth to 
attract investors when internally generated funds 
are not enough to finance the expected growth. The 
positive relationship is also consistent with agency 
II theory (principal-principal conflicts) where the 
severity of agency costs results in higher dividend 
regardless of the firms’ growth opportunities. The 
relationship between dividends and growth 
opportunity is found positive for Malaysian 
sampled firms by Ardestani et al. (2013), Benjamin 
et al. (2016) and Mui and Mustapha (2016).  
Profitability (ROA) is an insignificant factor 
related to dividend policy. Similarly, the results are 
inconsistent with pecking order theory, which 
suggests a positive relationship between dividend 
and profitability (Fama & French, 2002). However, 
it also supports the interpretation that managers 
only adjust their dividend payout ratio when the 
surplus of cash is persistent after balancing profits 
and investment opportunities. Al-Twaijry (2007) 
found an insignificant effect of profitability on the 
dividend policy of Malaysian firms. The results 
indicate a positive relationship between dividends 
and leverage ratio which is consistent with agency 
theory. This positive relationship infers that 
controlling shareholders set governance mechanism 
that compels managers to depend on debt and pay 
more dividends. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Dividends 
M1- 2sls M2- GMM M3- 2sls M4- GMM 
CON 0.098** 
(0.046) 
0.090* 
(0.068) 
0.083* 
(0.091) 
0.081* 
(0.092) 
Family 0.105*** 
(0.001) 
0.105*** 
(0.000) 
0.122*** 
(0.000) 
0.123*** 
(0.000) 
Managerial -0.161*** 
(0.000) 
-0.160*** 
(0.000) 
-0.178*** 
(0.000) 
-0.178*** 
(0.000) 
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Gov 0.122*** 
(0.000) 
0.124*** 
(0.004) 
0.114*** 
(0.010) 
0.116*** 
(0.009) 
Foreign 0.150*** 
(0.000) 
0.153*** 
(0.000) 
0.163*** 
(0.000) 
0.166*** 
(0.000) 
Tq 0.209*** 
(0.000) 
0.211*** 
(0.000) 
0.227*** 
(0.000) 
0.229*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 0.111 
(0.425) 
0.121 
(0.383) 
0.044 
(0.826) 
0.062 
(0.755) 
Leverage 0.343*** 
(0.007) 
0.355*** 
(0.005) 
0.369*** 
(0.003) 
0.383*** 
(0.002) 
Beta -0.097*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096 
(0.000) 
-0.097*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096*** 
(0.000) 
CON*Tq 
- - 
-0.090** 
(0.023) 
-0.088** 
(0.028) 
Family*Tq 
- - 
0.089*** 
(0.005) 
0.090*** 
(0.004) 
Managerial*Tq 
- - 
-0.112*** 
(0.000) 
-0.112*** 
(0.000) 
Gov*Tq 
- - 
-0.025 
(0.474) 
-0.026 
(0.454) 
Foreign*Tq 
- - 
-0.019 
(0.309) 
-0.021 
(0.268) 
     
N. Obs 1628 1628 1628 1628 
R2 % 11.63 10.76 10.91 9.87 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
The findings of the study show that corporate risk 
(Beta) has a negative relationship with dividend 
payout. The results support previous studies (Al-
Najjar & Hussainey, 2009; Amidu & Abor, 2006; 
Ibrahim Eldomiaty et al., 2014; Rozeff, 1982) who 
argue that firms’ risk increases the costs of finance, 
as a result, dividends decrease to avoid the need of 
external finance.   
As for corporate ownership variables, while 
Managerial ownership affects dividends negatively, 
substantial (CON), family, government and foreign 
ownerships affect dividends positively. Overall, the 
positive relationship between ownership 
concentration (CON) and dividends is identical 
with the agency theory. Ownership concentration 
induces substantial shareholders to incur the cost of 
monitoring for the interest of all shareholders 
(Harada & Nguyen, 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Therefore, the monitoring of substantial 
shareholders restrains managerial discretion and 
requests for higher dividends. The results are 
inconsistent with the assertion of previous studies 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Khan, 2006; Rozeff, 1982), 
which suggest that the ownership concentration 
creates the alignment between shareholders and 
managers, and this results in a negative relationship 
between dividends and ownership concentration. 
However, the results support the hypothesis of 
study that concentration of ownership aligns the 
interests toward growth opportunity while the 
demand of shareholders on free cash flow still 
remains. Similarly, the results indicate a positive 
relationship between dividend payout and both 
foreign (Foreign) and government (Gov) 
ownership. This result also suggests that the active 
monitoring of foreign and government ownership 
drives toward higher dividends.  
Managerial ownership (Managerial) has a negative 
relationship with dividend payout ratio which is 
consistent with agency theory postulate that the 
convergence associated with insider ownership 
attenuates agency costs (Rozeff, 1982). The 
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negative impact of managerial ownership supports 
the hypothesis of study that the convergence of 
interests is more pronounced when controlling 
shareholders have direct involvement in 
management. In the contrast, family ownership 
(Family) has a positive relationship with dividend 
payout ratio. The results indicate that although the 
direct representation in management, but family 
shareholders tends to pay higher dividends. The 
positive impact of family ownership is consistent 
with agency theory II, which argue that family 
firms tend to build up a good reputation by 
showing great attention to minority shareholders 
and their concern regarding expropriation (La Porta 
et al., 2000a). 
The results of interaction terms between corporate 
ownership variables and growth opportunity are 
presented in M3 and M4 from Table 4. After 
moderating for growth opportunity, the results 
show that only substantial (CON*Tq), family 
(Family*Tq) and managerial (Managerial*Tq) are 
significant, while government (Gov*Tq) and 
foreign (Foreign*Tq) are insignificant. Despite the 
positive direct relationship between concentration 
ownership and dividends, growth opportunity 
moderates the relation negatively. This means that 
large shareholders play a significant role in 
reducing agency cost and information asymmetry 
costs by monitoring the managers and request 
higher dividends when the firm has a lower growth 
opportunity. 
Concerning managerial ownership, the growth 
opportunity strengthens the negative relationship 
between managers’ shareholding and dividend 
payout. Contrary, growth opportunity moderates 
the relationship between family ownership and 
dividend positively. This means that family 
controlled firms keep pay higher dividend although 
there is a need of funds for expected growth 
opportunity. The results indicate the severity of 
agency problems associated with family ownership. 
Minority shareholders are more concerned 
regarding expropriation in family firms, drive 
pressure to higher dividends payout.  
The results of the current study show insignificant 
moderating effect of growth opportunity on the 
relationship between dividend payout and both 
government ownership and foreign ownership. The 
expected moderating effects were negative as the 
ownership concentration aligns the interests of 
shareholders and mangers toward investment 
growth. Therefore, firms with concentrated 
ownership reduce dividends when they experience 
high growth opportunity. However, the 
insignificant results might be due to the small 
shareholdings of foreign and government in the 
firms’ ownership where the mean values of their 
shareholdings are 11% and 8.5% respectively. 
5. Conclusion  
The study is aimed to provide some explanations 
for the inconclusive findings on the relationship 
between corporate ownership and dividend policy. 
Both dividend and corporate ownership structure 
reflect the firms' agency problem. While dividends 
mitigate agency through disgorging cash out, 
ownership concentration sets bidirectional effect in 
agency conflicts. Furthermore, the information 
asymmetry associated with growth opportunity 
increases the cost of finance and calls for lower 
dividend payout. However, the severity of agency 
problems in firms drives the concern toward 
disgorging out the free cash flow rather than 
hedging for future growth opportunities. 
Through testing a board set of corporate ownership 
identities and controlling for the moderating effect 
of growth opportunity, the study reveals that 
ownership concentration optimally reinforces 
monitoring on managers. The substantial 
shareholders oblige managers to pay a higher 
dividend which indicates the convergence of 
interests between minority and large shareholders. 
Meanwhile, growth opportunity moderates the 
relationship negatively which indicate alignment of 
interests between large shareholders and managers 
toward the optimal growth.  
Among corporate ownership identities, managerial 
ownership influences dividends payout negatively. 
Furthermore, the growth opportunity strengthens 
the negative impact of managerial shareholders on 
dividends. Family controlled firms give great 
attention to minority shareholders concerns where 
the family ownership keeps showing positive 
relationship even after considering the interaction 
effect of growth opportunity.  Government and 
foreign shareholders contribute to increasing the 
firms' dividend payout with weak evidence on the 
moderation effect of growth opportunity.  
The findings of the study seem to advocate several 
applications of the agency framework proposed by 
prior literature. The ownership concentration 
reduces agency costs when it creates alignment 
toward the optimal growth while the demand on 
free cash flow still remains through higher dividend 
payout as proposed by Jensen (1986). Second, the 
severity of agency problems might overwhelm the 
firm's concern about underinvestment problems in 
future and growth opportunity as proposed by La 
Porta et al. (2000a). 
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